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CLERKS IN THE MAZEt 
Pierre Schlag* 
It must be very difficult to be a judge - particularly an appellate 
judge. Not only must appellate judges reconcile often incommensur-
able visions of what law is, what it commands, or what it strives to 
achieve, but judges must do this largely alone. What little help they 
have in terms of actual human contact, apart from their clerks, typi-
cally takes the form of two or more advocates whose entire raison 
d'etre is to persuade, coax, and manipulate the judge into reaching a 
predetermined outcome - one which often instantiates or exemplifies 
only the most tenuous positive connection to the rhetoric of social pur-
pose, legal doctrine, and moral value deployed by the advocates. 
These are difficult - one might say, unusual - working condi-
tions. What makes them even more difficult is that, despite the origins 
of litigation in incommensurabilities, in contraries, and in contradic-
tions, the judge must end on a note that is often monistic: judgment 
affirmed; judgment reversed. True, sometimes there is the possibility 
of deferral - as in, for instance, that last line of the opinion that 
reads, "remanded." But even this is a qualified deferral - a time-
bound deferral, a temporary reprieve from final judgment. The judge 
is thus a monistic figure - one who says what the law is. And this law 
is always announced in the singular: there is always, at the end, from 
the judge's perspective and the parties' perspective, just one law. 1 The 
mysteries of these metamorphoses, of these transformations, have 
something to do with violence. 
The violence of judging. Not only do judges conclude their work 
on a note of violence- a death sentence, an incarceration, a compul-
sory wealth transfer - but, as Robert Cover observes, the entire ritu-
alized process of argument over which judges preside is itself fraught 
with violence. Judges· arrive at their decisions by killing off rival con-
ceptions of law. As Cover puts it, "[c]onfronting the luxuriant growth 
of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and de-
t Copyright 1993 by Pierre Schlag. All rights reserved. 
• Professor of Law, University of Colorado. - Ed. For comments and criticisms on earlier 
drafts, I wish to thank Paul Campos, Richard Delgado, Bill Goldberg, Josh Friedes, Brett Lilly, 
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1. It may, of course, not be the same law that the parties or the judge read into the judicial 
opinion. But, in each of their interested perspectives, they will each read one law. 
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stroy or try to destroy all the rest."2 Judges must destroy the worlds 
of meaning that others have constructed. Now, none of this, as Robert 
Cover himself cautions, is a criticism of judges or judging. 3 Indeed, to 
criticize judging because it involves violence is to misunderstand, or 
deny, the character of judging; it is to criticize judging because it is not 
busy being something else - some other more pacific activity. But 
even as it is inappropriate to criticize judges and judging for this im-
plicit violence, and even if nothing can be done about this irreducible 
violence, this does not mean that we should overlook the law's violent 
character. 
On the contrary, it is important to think about the violence im-
plicit in judging because it greatly affects what judges construct as 
"law." Indeed, once we recognize the violence implicit in the enter-
prise of judging, we are poised to understand that judges, far from 
having a "neutral" or a "detached" perspective on law, have instead a 
highly interested, partial perspective on law. Indeed, what judges take 
to be "law" is but a romanticized and inflated shadow image of all that 
law is and all that law does. Once we appreciate this point, we might 
even come to understand that the very elementary forms of the law of 
judges - the forms commonly known as "rules," "doctrines," "prin-
ciples," and so on - are themselves already highly self-interested 
constructions. 
The self-interested character of the law of judges may seldom be 
acknowledged in our public professional fora, but its existence is 
hardly surprising. On the contrary: it is obvious. Indeed, if, like a 
judge, one is continually engaged in destroying the worlds of meaning 
of others, if one is continually engaged in a practice fraught with vio-
lence, then one's authorization and legitimation needs are likely to be 
intense. Judges quite understandably want their juridical identities, 
their roles, and their actions to be authorized. They want authoriza-
tion in several senses. In one sense, judges want their own identities to 
be underwritten by a greater, grander power - a legitimating power 
like "The Text," "The Framers' Intent," "Justice," or, less grandly, 
"Doctrine." Not only do these "authoritative sources" help legitimate 
- a nonpejorative term here - the exercise of judicial power, but 
they help diffuse and distribute judicial responsibility. It is in virtue of 
these authorities that the actions of the judge become the actions of 
the community. In a second and closely related sense, judges seek au-
2. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983). 
3. Cover says that the balance of terror is pretty much the way he would want it. Robert M. 
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1608 (1986). 
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thorization in that they want a script to follow - a script which delin-
eates as clearly as possible who they are and what they must do. Such 
scripts - and here we can think of the doctrinal script as an example 
- do not just guide and legitimate the actions of judges; they fashion 
the judge's very identity, perhaps even detailing his exact lines. The 
appeal of such a steady script in a rhetorical situation, often fraught 
with uncertainty, unknowns, and violence, is clear. 
Now again, and I want to insist on this point, there is no criticism 
of judges or judging here. But there is the beginning of a question as 
to whether judges are particularly well suited or well situated to think 
critically or deeply about law. Indeed, the identity, the role, and the 
job tasks of the judge do not typically lead to asking questions in any 
intellectually sustained manner about the character of law - what it 
is, how it works, what it does, or how it should be. The only questions 
of this kind that can be asked from a judge's perspective must be for-
mulated in such a way that the questions, the answering, and the an-
swers do not threaten the validity or the value of the judge's own 
sources of authority. From the subject formation of the judge, the 
terminus of legal inquiry - whether concrete or theoretical - is al-
ways and already a foregone conclusion: there must be a noncon-
tradictory answer, a satisfactory solution, which, however formulated, 
preserves and maintains the integrity of the "authoritative sources" 
and the "authoritative methods." There is, thus, a very real sense in 
which the judge wants not to see, wants not to understand, wants not to 
pursue certain lines of inquiry. Indeed, the very construction of judges 
- that which enables them to be judges at all - will lead them in 
important senses not to see, not to understand, not to pursue certain 
lines of inquiry. 
All of this suggests that "law," as constructed from the perspective 
of the judge, may well be a rather limited intellectual production -
that is, one whose internal configurations and potential turn out to be 
intellectually rather limited. Now, what makes this "law" intellectu-
ally limited is not the abstract fact that there are certain things it does 
not want to see or understand or pursue. Indeed, all disciplines -
including the most fertile - are constituted by a kind of formative 
forgetting. What is different about this "law" of judges is that the 
formative forgetting is given shape not by a desire to produce knowl-
edge, insight, or understanding, but rather by that "law's" desire to 
hide from itself its own violent character. 
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* * * 
The reason I mention all this is that it has been precisely the 
judge's perspective that has dominated and organized American aca-
demic legal thought for more than a century. Indeed the persona of 
the judge has served as the single, unitary subject formation that en-
ables the American legal academic representation of "law." The pro-
totypical legal academic has a strong identification with this judicial 
persona. For many legal academics this identification is cemented in 
the venerated and gateway tradition of the judicial clerkship. In this 
tradition, the young law graduate, soon to become an academic, is ini-
tiated in his first "real" law job by a judge who reveals to him what 
was withheld in law school: the "real" process of crafting a judicial 
opinion and a "real," even if exaggerated, experience of the power of 
the judge. For many legal academics, the clerkship is a defining mo-
ment - one from which they never recover. They become clerks for 
life. 
* * * 
Not surprisingly, the "law" of the academy bears the marks of the 
subject formation, the judge, through which this "law" is metaphori-
cally, allegorically, and aesthetically constructed. This is true in an 
obvious, even if seldom acknowledged, sense: in the law school class-
room, as in the casebook, as in the prototypical law school exam, as in 
the prototypical scholarly work, all kinds oflaw - statutory, adminis-
trative, customary, institutional - are presented and explored 
through the focused aesthetic and the specific problematics of the judi-
cial opinion. 4 The judicial opinion and the judicial persona provide 
the implicit framing and orientation for the presentation and elabora-
tion of the "law" of the academy. This point itself is rather obvious, 
but its implications are not. The consequence of the legal academic's 
identification with the persona of the judge has very serious implica-
tions for the construction of the "law" of the academy. As will be 
seen, the "law" of the academy is characterized by a profound ten-
dency to destroy cultural, intellectual, and thus, legal meaning. More-
over, the "law" of the academy is constantly preoccupied with 
refashioning the rationalization of "law's" violence in such a way that 
reckoning with this violence is continually deferred. 
Indeed, the obvious dissonance between the "law" of the academy 
and the law practiced by lawyers has nothing in particular to do with 
4. JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW 108-12 (1985). 
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the embrace of "theory" or the abandonment of "doctrine" in the 
academy. It has everything to do with the fact that lawyers under-
stand the violent, instrumental, and performative potentials of any 
given law while legal academics strive mightily - whether they are 
doing "theory" or "doctrine" - to avoid such recognition. A lawyer 
looks at doctrine and sees a tool, a vehicle, an opportunity, a threat, a 
guarantee. A legal academic typically sees only a propositional 
statement. 
* * * 
The violence of the "law" of the academy is often not immediately 
visible. In part, that is because the strategies that have been deployed 
to distance this violence and to defer reckoning with this violence have 
already achieved success. Yet, for those willing to notice, the violence 
implicit in the law of the academy is easily retrieved - if only because 
it is inscribed everywhere. 
Consider, for instance, the brilliant though destructive radical re-
ductionism of Christopher Langdell's famous preface to his first con-
tracts casebook. In that preface, Langdell reduces the "law" to a 
compendium of "certain principles or doctrines."5 Along the way, 
common law cases are reduced to mere vehicles for studying the true 
essence oflaw, namely, "certain principles or doctrines." The result of 
such formalist efforts is that the pluralism of common law narratives is 
rudely reduced to certain "essential doctrines."6 
The legal academy does, of course, recover somewhat from this 
foundational destruction and, at various times, recognizes law to be 
something more than mere propositional statements - for instance, a 
craft, a skill, a cognitive capacity, a social formation, an aesthetic, a 
politics, a social steering mechanism, a dispute resolution process, and 
so on. But the recovery has been only partial. All these different per-
spectives on law, for all their potential richness, have nonetheless typi-
cally remained focused on rationalizing the Langdellian legal ontology 
of "certain principles or doctrines." The Langdellian destruction 
continues. 
Indeed, this ongoing historical destruction of cognitive and inter-
pretive possibility has become institutionalized in the law student's ed-
ucation. The first year of law school, as it is traditional~y conceived, 
consists largely in imparting cognitive deficits to law students - an 
almost physiological incapacity to read "authoritative texts" in any 
5. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at vi 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871). 
6. Id. at vii. 
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but the highly delimited authoritative manner. 7 Karl Llewellyn, in 
1930, described the first year in revealingly brutal terms. The physi-
cality and violence of his nouns, verbs, and adjectives are almost 
palpable: 
The first year ... aims to drill into you the more essential techniques of 
handling cases. . .. The hardest job of the first year is to lop off your 
commonsense, to knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your 
view of social policy, your sense of justice - to knock these out of you 
along with woozy thinking, along with ideas all fuzzed along their edges. 
You are to acquire ability to think precisely, to analyze coldly, to work 
within a body of materials that is given, to see, and see only, and manipu-
late, the machinery of the law.8 
It is no wonder, of course, that this sort of "training" produces the 
sense in many students that the Socratic method is "an assault."9 As 
one former law student put it, "[t]he observation that students often 
respond physically and emotionally to questioning as though they 
were in the presence of a profound danger is simply true. "to 
In jurisprudence, this violent and destructive tendency is often 
given expression and force in the famous distinction between the "in-
ternal perspective" and the "external perspective."11 Here, the dis-
tinction is rendered by Ronald Dworkin: 
People who have law make and debate claims about what law permits or 
forbids . . . . This crucial argumentative aspect of legal practice can be 
studied in two ways or from two points of view. One is the external point 
of view of the sociologist or historian .... The other is the internal point 
of view of those who make the claims. 
This book takes up the internal, participants' point of view; it tries to 
grasp the argumentative character of our legal practice by joining that 
practice and struggling with the issues of soundness and truth partici-
pants face. We will study formal legal argument/ram the judge's view-
7. I make no claims here about whether this first-year violence is functional or not. Within a 
functionalist framework, one could easily see the impartation of cognitive deficits as serving to 
create a class of professionals guaranteed to interpret any and all texts in the most highly delim-
ited and stereotyped manner. People with such cognitive deficits could then be counted upon to 
produce a relative stability or certainty in the fashioning and interpretation of legally significant 
acts. 
8. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 102 (1930) (emphasis added). 
9. Duncan Kennedy, Note, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, YALE REV. L. & Soc. 
ACTION, Spring 1970, at 71, 72-73. 
10. Id. at 73 (footnote omitted). 
11. H.L.A. Hart, for instance, believed that it was useful to distinguish two points of view on 
legal rules. The external point of view is that of the "observer who does not himself accept" the 
legal rules, whereas the internal point of view is that of the "member of the group which accepts 
and uses them as guides to conduct." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86 (1961). For 
Hart, the external point of view can be useful to predict the behavior of members of the group. 
What it cannot do, however, is reproduce "the way in which the rules function in the lives of 
certain members of the group." Id. at 88. 
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point . . . because judicial argument about claims of law is a useful 
paradigm for exploring the central, propositional aspect of legal 
practice.12 
As Dworkin's telling and indeed representative statement reveals, 
the "internal perspective" is used to reduce "law" to the usual 
Langdellian object - forms - what Dworkin calls "the central, pro-
positional aspect of legal practice" - and to eliminate perspectives 
that might advance any troublesome learning not consonant with "the 
judge's viewpoint" or his authority. Indeed, no sooner does Dworkin 
invoke the distinction than he immediately presses it into service to 
relegate "history" and "sociology" to the realm of the external, some-
where outside the realm of law. 
This use of the internal-external perspective distinction is proto-
typical. Indeed, the distinction is typically used to patrol the borders 
of Law's Empire. 13 It is used to rule out of bounds any perspective on 
law that is not consonant with what the judicial persona already takes 
to be "law." In this uncritical deployment of the internal-external per-
spective distinction, the law is simply presumed to be separated from 
the rest of the world by a border that neatly divides the two into an 
inside and an outside. In this same move, the wielder of this distinc-
tion typically bestows upon himself the authority to declare what be-
longs on the inside and what belongs on the outside. It is as if the legal 
academic could usefully pronounce on the value of an intellectual en-
terprise in the same way that a judge can rule from the bench on a 
motion to exclude evidence. Sometimes the internal-external perspec-
tive distinction is deployed in even cruder ways. Indeed, the destruc-
tive and violent effects of the academy's judge-centered vision is 
perhaps most easily seen in those academic writings that strive to rid 
the intellectual scene of certain inquiries or points of view by simply 
declaring them to be "nihilistic."14 
While these kinds of brutal and blunt actions are one way in which 
the law of the academy exhibits its violent and profoundly antiintellec-
tual character, they are certainly not the only way. Much of the vio-
lence of the "law" of the academy is more subtle. Much of this 
violence involves the forced recasting of intellectual and cultural in-
sights from other disciplines into forms and uses that accord with the 
aesthetics of the judge: the legal brief, the legal opinion, the 1,000-
12. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 13-14 (1986) (emphasis added). 
13. For an elaboration of the role and aesthetic composition of the internal-external perspec-
tive dichotomy, see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 
916-29 (1991). 
14. (Many citations omitted.) 
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footnote law review article. It is in this way that deconstruction is 
reduced to a legal reasoning technique. It is in this way that herme-
neutics is crystallized into a method for advancing progressive legal 
thought. It is in this way that [ ... ] is degraded into [ .... ] Foreign 
disciplines and their insights do gain admittance to law, but only to 
the extent they are recast to conform to the normative instrumental 
projects of the "law" of the academy. In general, foreign disciplines 
are to the "law" of the academy as expert testimony is to litigation: a 
largely instrumental display or simulation of intellectual authority and 
competence. This sort of normative instrumentalization of other intel-
lectual traditions destroys the intellectual, perceptual, and aesthetic re-
sources and capacities through which we (you and I) might make 
sense of our world and our law. At the level of the individual, this 
normative instrumentalization destroys cognitive capacity, the ability 
to think in a wide variety of different interpretive, aesthetic, and cogni-
tive frames. At the level of the social, this normative instrumentaliza-
tion destroys cultural and intellectual memory. It puts cultural and 
intellectual resources beyond retrieval. It turns legal subjects into 
pawns. It makes the legal world flat - as if all truths worth knowing 
about law could be stated in the aesthetic, in the linguistic forms, in 
the normative persuasional grammar of the legal brief, the legal opin-
ion, or the 1000-footnote law review article. 15 
* * * 
The reason I mention all this violence at the heart of the "law" of 
the academy is that it would seem to present significant difficulties for 
constituting or maintaining law as a vital intellectual discipline. With 
this sort of generic destructive orientation at the very heart oflaw, it is 
difficult to see how this discipline can achieve very much in the way of 
knowledge or insight. Its attitude toward the world and itself does not 
seem terribly open, or curious, or searching, or anything else that one 
might associate with a vital intellectual endeavor. 
With so much violence at the heart of law, the discipline of law is, 
in some sense, constantly driven to try to escape from or deny its own 
violent ontology. Law is thus constantly in flight from itself - seek-
ing to represent itself as some highly purified, chastened, idealized, or 
redemptive version of itself. This is why in the "law" of the academy 
we get so much happy talk jurisprudence - promises of law as "a 
grand conversation," promises of law as subservient to "progressive 
15. This argument (with specific reference to deconstruction) is elaborated in Pierre Schlag, 
"Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990). 
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legal thought," promises of law as responsive to the imperatives of 
"efficiency," promises of a law that is always already one way or an-
other becoming the very best it can be. Of course, this desire for flight 
from the violent character of law is also why legal thinkers continually 
confuse and conflate "really good" legal thought with legal thought 
that makes them/eel really good. Making the law feel really good-
or, in more technical terms, "making the law the best it can be" - is 
not some mere side effect of legal academic enterprise: it is the legal 
academic enterprise. It is the perfected expression of a law that is in 
flight from its own violent ontology. 
This same pattern is also enacted when we move from the norma-
tive celebrations oflaw to the normative criticisms oflaw. Indeed, the 
constitution of law as in flight from its own violent and destructive 
character helps account for why normative protests that law should be 
more self-conscious, more empathic, more moral, more sensitive to 
context, and so on, always resonate with the academic audience and 
simultaneously always already miss their mark. These claims always 
resonate because law is always lacking in the humane qualities to 
which its academic custodians aspire. In this endlessly repeated obser-
vation, the academic custodians of the law could not be more right. 
But the claims also always already miss their mark because, as mere 
normative or epistemic criticisms, they leave the violent ontology of 
law completely untouched. Hence, whether cast as celebration or as 
criticism, the normative prescriptions of the "law" of the academy 
generally end up as part of the cheerful, happy, self-congratulatory 
celebration of a law whose violence and destructiveness thus become 
obscured. 
All of this suggests great problems for the construction of "law" as 
a vital intellectual discipline. Indeed, if the generic generative gesture 
that gives rise to the "law" of the academy lies in transforming law 
into an idealized image of itself-whether as "doctrine," or "theory," 
or whatever - then we will have an academic discipline constituted as 
a continual attempt to escape from its own object.16 Its very object of 
study will have been constituted as cheerful, idealized, purified simula-
tion of the ostensible object of study. Hence, instead of studying law, 
legal academics will be studying "doctrine" which, of course, they will 
16. Indeed, much of academic law can be seen as successive attempts to enact and institu-
tionalize precisely this escape. The "pure theory" decried by Judge Edwards can be seen, as he 
does, as one such attempted flight. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). But, of course, precisely the 
same claim can be made about what he calls "doctrine" or "legal process." Doctrine is simply 
yesterday's successful theory. What it has going for it is that it has achieved success. What it has 
going against it is precisely the same thing. 
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call "law." Instead of studying decisionmaking, legal academics will 
be studying judicial opinions which they will call [ .... ] Instead of 
studying [ ... ] (and so on). The critical ontological entities - rules, 
doctrines, principles, opinions, policies, and so forth - will have been 
from the very start treated as "real" law despite their obvious collec-
tive incompleteness and their radical individual underspecification. 
What regularity or groundedness these terms will offer over the course 
of centuries, decades, or the next fifteen minutes will depend upon the 
legal academic's formative identification with the persona of the judge 
- a persona ineluctably given to acts of elaborate self-rationalization. 
Now, again, none of this is offered here as a criticism of judges or 
judging. It does, however, make one wonder whether this is a sound 
constitutive matrix for the construction of a vital intellectual 
discipline. 
Not only is this arguably not an auspicious beginning, but it does 
not get any better than this. On the contrary, the destructive tenden-
cies of the "law" of the academy, together with its sustained drive to 
rationalize and legitimate what is already considered "law," make it 
virtually impossible for the "law" of the academy to learn or produce 
anything new. Nor is this formative orientation likely to change eas-
ily. For one thing, the "law" of the academy cannot easily take cogni-
zance of its own destructive and violent character because, like its 
organizing source-persona, the judge, it is constituted to deny this de-
struction and violence. Moreover, any chance encounters with intel-
lectual or cultural insights that might enable the "law" of the academy 
to recognize its own violent character, and its tendencies to rationali-
zation and legitimation, are immediately judged to be "external" to 
law or are otherwise slated for destruction. 
The "law" of the academy - glittering with all sorts of norma-
tively glowing representations of itself - is thus defensive and author-
itarian. Indeed, what else could it be? Given the intellectually 
unstable character of the "law" of the academy as in flight from its 
own violent character, as in flight from its own object, all there is to 
protect this "law" from intellectual challenges is the disciplinary 
power of its constituting, organizing source-persona, namely, the 
judge. Thus, when the "law" of the academy encounters new intellec-
tual currents - everything from hermeneutics, to poststructuralism, 
to anthropology - the first contact tends to exhibit a sort of violent 
adjudicatory character. Typically there is no serious intellectual en-
gagement. Instead, what we typically get is the academic equivalent of 
a ruling from the bench on whether the foreign insight or idea is or is 
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not useful to law's empire.17 It does not augur well for an intellectual 
discipline if its constitutive disposition is basically to avoid, so far as 
possible, learning anything new. This is not the sort of disposition that 
one would expect to produce a vital intellectual practice. 
Now, if the law of the academy is prompted by a desire for flight 
from its own object, from its own violent character, and if its destruc-
tive and violent tendencies are manifested in an ongoing desire not to 
see, not to understand, not to pursue certain lines of inquiry then what 
have legal academics been doing all these years? This seems like a 
difficult question - until, of course, we realize that the answer has 
already been given. In their identification with the organizing source-
persona of the judge, legal academics engage in the legitimation and 
rationalization of judicial opinions. In the first instance, it is the vio-
lence of judges and judging that they rationalize and legitimate. In the 
second instance, when these legitimations and rationalization have 
taken hold, and the violence of judges and judging have receded from 
view, legal academics simply rationalize the rationalizations and legiti-
mate the legitimations and so on reflexively. This practice is not as 
esoteric as it may first seem. On the contrary, it is downright com-
monplace. Consider, after all, that the prototypical doctrinal law re-
view article is itself a legitimation of other legitimating artifacts -
namely, judicial opinions. Consider also that the bulk of "law and 
... "work as well as of "theory" is itself often little more than a partic-
ularly abstract kind of mimesis of the legitimating strategies of lower 
order legitimating artifacts such as "doctrine" or "case law." 
Nor is it the case that the legitimating strategies of the academy 
are particulary illuminating - intellectually or otherwise. On the 
contrary, two rather simple legitimating strategies account for much 
of the "law" of the academy. The first legitimating strategy is that of 
constrain and control. For more than a century, legal thinkers have 
sought to fashion "doctrine" or other object-forms of law that would 
not merely inform, but constrain and control the actions of the judge. 
This legitimating strategy can be understood as a response to the im-
plicit violence of judging. If the judge is not constrained and con-
trolled, then the violence of judgment may well be wrought in 
completely illegitimate ways upon nondeserving parties. The peren-
nial focus oflegal thinkers on "constraint," "restraint," "binding doc-
trine," "objectivity," and so on is an attempt to rationalize the 
violence of the law of judges by constraining it a priori to selected 
identifiable instances of legitimate use. Similarly, the fascination with 
17. (Citations omitted.) 
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observing procedural regularity, with the meticulous dissecting exami-
nation of what procedural regularity has produced, with gapless dem-
onstrations of an unbroken chain between a decision and its origins in 
some canonical text or act or institution is also an attempt to secure, a 
priori, the rationality of the violence of judges and judging. This fasci-
nation with pedigree and provenance is inscribed everywhere - from 
sophisticated expression in the great works of the legal positivists, to 
the ordinary practice of stare decisis, to the internalized observance of 
exquisitely detailed, "authoritative" hierarchies in legal academic hir-
ing, publication, and professional recognition. Not surprisingly, this 
strategy of constrain and control produces a constricted form of 
thought. The attitude of this legal thinker is that of a sculptor work-
ing cautiously and carefully on the monument of law. He dare not 
have a creative idea, certainly not a big idea, lest it chip or crack the 
monument of law in an irretrievable manner. The attitude is one of 
self-abnegation. Ironically, despite the constricted form of thought 
produced through this legitimation strategy of constrain and control, 
there is one aspect in which it knows no limits, no restraint at all: that 
is in the unfettered attempt to dissect and differentiate its own minute 
contributions to the edifice of law into even tinier analytical pieces. 
The second strategy is one of justify and redeem. This strategy 
attempts to articulate the justifications or the redemptions that are to 
guide the development and deployment of law. Again, this strategy 
can be understood as a response to the implicit violence of judges and 
judging. If there are no justifications or redeeming virtues for law, 
then the violence of the judge may well remain unjustified. The peren-
nial focus of legal thinkers on justification, on the offering of reasons 
and on the formulation of normative prescriptions is an attempt to 
rationalize the violence of the law of judges by limiting its use to the 
achievement of good, widely shared ends. Similarly, the fascination 
with the question, "what should the law be?" and the fascination with 
the constant advocacy of goodness, rightness, and justice are also at-
tempts to ensure that there is never a moment when the normative 
validity or the ethical identity of law might actually be in serious ques-
tion. This fascination with moral totems is inscribed everywhere -
from sophisticated expression in the philosophical theories of moralist 
thinkers like Ronald Dworkin, to the mundane practice of policy and 
principle justification in judicial opinions, to the idolatrous worship of 
sacred signifi.ers like "The Constitution," "Rights," "Progressive," or 
even "Transformative Action," among legal academics. It is inscribed 
in the very aesthetic structure of the usual law review narrative, which 
typically proceeds in a cheerful progression from inefficiency to effi-
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ciency, iniquity to goodness, oppression to liberation, or, to put it in 
generic terms, from insuperable illegitimacy to general moral wonder-
fu1ness. This moralizing tendency is inscribed as well in the political-
intellectual syndicalism that organizes and regulates faction fights on 
faculties, hiring decisions, and the like. The justify and redeem strat-
egy thus produces a conventionally politicized environment in which 
normativity is used to police or extinguish thought - all, of course, in 
the name of the very best values, the most worthy objectives. In the 
justify and redeem strategy, nothing can be said or thought about the 
law unless it demonstrably tends to advance conventionally sanctioned 
descriptions of the good, the just, the right, and so on. Not surpris-
ingly, with the moral stakes so high, the legal thinker in the grips of 
this kind of legitimation strategy tends to worry a lot. For this legal 
thinker, the world and the law are things to wring one's hands over. 
In the justify and redeem legitimating strategy, the surface recognition 
of the potential of law for violence thus results in great angst-ridden 
displays of guilt and contrition. This is often accompanied by grand 
demonstrations of profound and tragic moral concern often accompa-
nied by self-righteous and indignant outrage, which ironically (though 
predictably enough) yields a kind of self-congratulatory feel-good ju-
risprudence. Like the constrain and control strategy, then, there is also 
one way in which the justify and redeem strategy knows no limits. It 
has an absolute and absolutely remarkable faith in the use and the 
usefu1ness of "law" and legal argument for the achievement of the 
good, the just, the right, and so on. 
As legitimating strategies, constrain and control as well as justify 
and redeem, of course, have very appealing aspects. Hence, constrain 
and control can be seen as an entirely appropriate response to the po-
tential of law for violence. The strategy recognizes that the law en-
forced by judges is not an appealing medium, that it is destructive, and 
that therefore it must be used sparingly, in the most limited and care-
fully monitored situations. The constrain and control strategy thus 
finds its most perfected expression in standard conservative politics, 
which seek to minimize the use of "law" to regulate human affairs. If 
law is a destructive, undesirable, and painful mode of human associa-
tion, then there is a certain amount of sense in trying to limit its use 
and its jurisdiction. How then does this legitimating strategy go 
wrong? It goes wrong in imagining that there is still some sector oflife 
- some "private" sector - that remains relatively separate from, and 
impervious to, the mediating and regulative categories and grammar 
of the bureaucratic state. This is not our situation. Hence, the choice 
is not, as conservatives would want it, between use of law to regulate 
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human affairs, on one hand, and reliance on some idealized vision of 
private initiative untainted by legalism, on the other. And, because, 
contrary to the political desires of conservatives, this is not the choice, 
constrain and control cannot effectuate a selection between a destruc-
tive legalism and something else. All it can do is effectuate a selection 
between one kind of destructive legalism and another. 
The justify and redeem strategy can also, at first, be seen as an 
appealing response to the problem of violence. Whereas constrain and 
control abandons the possibility of humanizing law and thus strives to 
restrict its use andjurisdiction,justify and redeem abandons the possi-
bility of restricting law's use and jurisdiction and instead strives to 
humanize the law. If law has become America's civil religion, if it is 
all pervasive, if it has become a critical source of communal meaning 
and organization, then it might make some sense to strive to humanize 
this law. How, then, does this legitimating strategy go wrong? It goes 
wrong in imagining that, by substituting the language of moral philos-
ophy, of values talk, for the more technical language of doctrine and 
legal authority, the law might become more humane. Again, this is 
not our situation. Law, as it is practiced by lawyers, does not become 
more humane simply because they learn to use nicer, warmer signifiers 
(like "love" or "care"). Lawyers can be forced - a term deliberately 
used - to use nicer-warmer signifiers, but they will, of course, use 
these nicer-warmer, kinder-gentler signifiers in the same old coercive 
ways, to accomplish the same old performative tasks they were hired 
to do. The mistake here is roughly, not exactly, the same as that of the 
constrain and control strategy. The constrain and control strategy 
imagines that there is some prelegal world of culture or self that is at 
once untainted and resistant to the bureaucratic state. The justify and 
redeem strategy imagines that there is a set of signifiers - signifiers 
usually associated with moral philosophy or value talk - that are not 
only impervious to, but that in fact will transcend, the instrumentalist 
grammar of the bureaucratic state. This mistake is presently charac-
teristic of the academic liberal-left. What the academic liberal-left 
does is heat its own favorite signifiers - signifiers like "politics" or 
"progressive legal change" - as somehow mysteriously exempt from 
social construction and still fully context-transcendent after all these 
years. 
Notice that both the constrain and control strategy and the justify 
and redeem strategy go wrong in much the same way. They both take 
their (intellectually antiquated) political desires as descriptive of their 
own situation. Neither is to be faulted for this. On the contrary: the 
institution of such deception, of such self-deception, is precisely what 
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legitimating strategies are all about. Indeed, what else is to be ex-
pected from a legitimating strategy? The critical question is: how well 
are they doing it? The answer is not ve.ry well at all. Rather than 
experiencing either or both of these legitimating strategies as ethically 
generative or intellectually vital, our experience is altogether different. 
Both of these legitimating strategies are, of course, quite constrict-
ing. They are both institutionalized forms of thought control. Not 
only do they limit what can be thought or asked about law, but in fact 
they organize and institute legal thought as a tedious repetition of -
what else? - themselves. This is why, in the "law" of the academy, 
we seem always to be rediscovering the same old truths. This is why, 
in the "law" of the academy, if you have an idea, it is probably not 
"law," and why, if you are doing "law," you probably have no ideas. 
This is why one often gets the feeling at legal conferences that virtually 
nothing is being said. That is because nothing really is being said. 
Instead, legal thinkers are, for the most part, enacting the strategies of 
constrain and control and justify and redeem. They are sticking very 
closely to the approved, cautious, incrementalist methods of constrain 
and control and very closely to the conventionally sanctioned, norma-
tive narratives of justify and redeem. In the constrain and control 
strategy, legal thought is protected by elaborate burdens of proof, co-
pious disclaimers, and very careful delimitations of the operative juris-
diction. In the justify and redeem strategy, legal thought is wrapped in 
an extensive padding of normatively wonderful signifiers and moral 
self-congratulation. Indeed, with all this institutional and rhetorical 
constriction and all this aura of destruction, the presentation of legal 
thought is framed very defensively. This is why legal thinkers are al-
ways taking "stances" and trying to "defend" their "positions." In-
deed, with all this aura of destruction around, could one really expect 
anything else? 
Now, so far, I have described the world of academic law as (1) 
constituted by a desire for flight from its own violent character, (2) 
constructed so as to avoid learning anything new, and (3) given to 
rationalizing its own rationalizations. As a constitutive matrix for an 
intellectual discipline, this is, to say it again, not an auspicious start. 
But note that, in this presentation, what I have done is simply trace 
the implications of the legal academic's primal identification with the 
persona of the judge. The three tendencies discussed above have thus 
been presented in a static frame. In order to understand our situation, 
it is necessary to present the matter dynamically. We need to consider 
what happens over time when both legal academics and judges are 
fashioned with these destructive, world-denying motivations and these 
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rationalizing tendencies and are then asked to train each other, to see 
and construct "law" in terms of the perspective of the other. Does law 
work itself pure? 
This is not an idle inquiry. Consider that, on the academic side, we 
get some of the very brightest people of each generation to work 
within this medium of the "law" of the academy. What happens when 
very intelligent people are asked to operate within this discursive 
world constructed as a flight from its own object, a discursive world 
given to elaborate, self-referential layers of self-legitimation and self-
rationalization, a discursive world bent so far as possible on not learn-
ing anything new and reaffirming itself as the same? What happens 
when extremely intelligent people are asked to perform within this sort 
of discursive universe and are constructed through disciplinary power 
to observe this institutionalized and cognitively embedded etiquette? 
What do they do? What do they write? What is to be expected? 
Fortunately, we are not answering these questions in the hypothet-
ical. We have over a hundred years of answers to examine. Mostly 
what these extremely intelligent people do, it turns out, is construct 
extremely intricate and elaborate structures and then try to rationalize 
these structures. In short, they build mazes. Most of the time these 
schemes tum out to be something that might be called "doctrine"; 
sometimes they look more like what might be called "theory."18 
Either way what we get is an extraordinarily variegated law - a law 
which is internally differentiated in multilayered self-referential ways. 
What we get are a series of increasingly specific rationalizations linked 
to other rationalizations via an orderly system of rationalizations. 
Now, to the extent one is operating within any of the currently avail-
able rationalization programs - efficiency analysis, ad hoc doctrinal-
ism, ad hoc policy instrumentalism, ad hoc pragmatism, ad hoc 
whatever - the "law" of the academy makes a certain amount of 
sense. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to disprove the validity or value 
of any of these rationalization programs. It is difficult because, at this 
late date, the hypertrophy of self-referential rationalization has ob-
scured most of what might be called the referents from view. And 
since the logic of this self-referentiality consists mostly of self-congrat-
18. To me it does not really matter much: this doctrine-theory distinction is vastly over-
stated. Much of what passes for "theory" in the academy is a kind of normative or normatively 
driven theory. It is in short, a kind ofmetadoctrine, doctrine in waiting, doctrine wannabe. It is, 
a doctrine of the doctrine - which is, of course, entirely fitting given the age-old self-image of 
the legal academic as the judge of the judges. As for doctrine itself, its claims to be separate from 
theory are overstated as well. Doctrine is simply yesterday's theory successfully transubstanti-
ated into an authoritative juridical artifact. Doctrine is simply the activity of theory reduced to 
an artifactual status. 
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ulation, the rationalization programs are well defended. What is 
more, these programs are constructed in ways that authorize and legit-
imate the destruction of new nonconforming views and their relega-
tion to the oblivion of the external perspective. How then could these 
rationalization programs possibly go wrong? 
In some senses, it seems as if they cannot. These mazes built of 
massively overwrought doctrine, of sacred historical text fragments, of 
multilayered bureaucratic processes and sundry dominions of exper-
tise, of massive economic or moral theoretical structures deployed to 
resolve picayune legal problems, are the mazes that legal academics 
run. While these mazes are all different, they are all aesthetically very 
much the same: they are constructed of repeated exercises of constrain 
and control andjustify and redeem. What these mazes have going for 
them is that, over time, they produce certain cognitive and aesthetic 
deficits. They produce subjects - legal subjects - who are so caught 
up in the rationalizations and the legitimations that they systemati-
cally conflate: 
the regulative ideal of thoughtful, searching, and comprehensive judicial 
opinions 
with 
the regulatory bureaucratic noise of contemporary Supreme Court 
opinions; 
the eternal form of law 
with 
the formative jurisprudential experience of their youth - [ ... ];19 
engaging in transformative or progressive political action 
with 
writing passionate law review articles in favor of transformative or progres-
sive political action. · 
Each of these conflations is in an important sense the same conflation, 
the same confusion - a confusion that arises when the legal academic 
subject becomes so immersed in and so suffused with the legitimations 
and rationalizations of the "law" of the academy that he or she has 
become incapable of distinguishing the referent from the simulation. 
In this discursive world, the identity and the ontological status of the 
19. Pick one and insert as appropriate: 
a) legal process 
b) formalism · 
c) moralism 
d) taking over the administration building 
e) (as yet unnamed). 
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main terms and the main grammar are at once almost always beyond 
question, and yet almost always dramatically underspecified.20 As a 
partial preliminary list of such terms, consider the following: 
The Law 








The First Amendment 
The Text 
The Intent of .... 
Nihilism 






Now, among the appropriate legal academic audience, the invocation 
of these terms, in accordance with their usual accompanying gram-
mar, will, with surprising frequency, simply arrest thought upon im-
pact. This dramatic arresting effect is part of the legitimation or 
delegitimation value of these terms. The terms are either so obviously 
true and good or so obviously false and wrong that their identity and 
ontological status are not and need not be questioned. Instead, 
whatever these terms may be missing in intellectual content - which, 
of course, is usually everything - is always already compensated 
through the legitimating or delegitimating projections of the appropri-
ate legal academic audience. 
The sort of desperate attempts that we see currently among leading 
legal academics to infuse vitality into these virtually empty signifiers 
- everything from "The Rule of Law" to "Progressive Legal 
Change" to "Politics" - is a testimony to their vacuity. The vacuity 
of these vain terms should not surprise for their accmpanying gram-
mar is generally so vacuous as well. Indeed, consider that a great deal 
of the legal academic conversation can be understood as little more 
20. Could we be talking about God substitutes again? Sure. See KENNETH BURKE, A 
GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 355 (1945) ("For a 'God term designates the ultimate motivation, or 
substance, of a Constitutional frame."). For my part, I call these little items, "theoretical un-
mentionables." For a description of their structure and function, see Pierre Schlag, Contradic-
tion and Denial, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1216, 1222-23 (1989) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE 
TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)). 
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than an ongoing debate between generally conservative-right propo-
nents of constrain and control and generally liberal-left proponents of 
justify and redeem. It has been, in short, a very long conversation 
carried on between two impossible visions, neither of which could pos-
sibly register in our present social circumstances - except, of course, 
as legitimations. Legitimations of what? Legitimations first and fore-
most of themselves. Legitimations secondarily of each other, for if one 
part of the opposition drops out, the other makes little sense: No 
Dworkin without a Bork. No Radin without an Epstein. No [ ... ] 
without a [ ... ], and so on. Thirdly, what these legitimating strategies 
are legitimating is their own unconscious construction of an extraordi-
narily florid bureaucratic legalism that knows no limits in its internal 
differentiation nor in its territorial acquisition of new subject matter to 
be submitted to the regimes of "The Rule of Law," or "Progressive 
Legal Change," or "Politics," or whatever. In short, these legitima-
tions are legitimations of the maze. 
Is this surprising? Is it surprising that one day the grand legitimat-
ing strategies of law should appear vacuous? Is this surprising -
given the constitutive desire of the law of the academy not to see, not 
to understand, not to pursue certain lines of inquiry? Is this surprising 
given the legal academy's sustained construction of mazes upon mazes 
of rationalizations of rationalizations? Is this surprising, given the 
formative core of destructiveness and violence at the heart of the 
"law" of the academy? Is it surprising that the "law" of the academy 
should consume itself in this way - find itself one day in an extraordi-
narily extensive maze not knowing what to do or where to go and with 
only the most self-congratulatory versions of extradisciplinary knowl-
edges available to help? Is this surprising? 
No. 
What might be, in one sense, surprising - though, not according 
to this essay-is that the "law" of the academy, a law which has been 
bent on so much destructiveness and so much denial of its own de-
structive impulses, has been able to portray itself and its various mazes 
as somehow constructive. One can see how this claim is itself con-
structed if we look at the recent argument offered in Judge Edwards' 
article.21 Judge Harry Edwards complains that various parties in the 
legal academy are contributing to the ethical corruption of young law-
yers by supposedly abandoning "doctrine" in favor of "theory." Now, 
this too might seem to be a surprising claim. Indeed, before the theo-
rists or any of the younger intellectuals appeared on the legal scene, 
21. Edwards, supra note 18. 
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legal academics of Judge Edwards' generation and those before had 
been representing law as an idealized ordering of clean propositional 
statements, known as "certain doctrines and principles." They had 
developed an extremely intricate system of doctrines and cases and 
legal interpretation that successfully eclipsed the destructiveness and 
violence of law and judging. In order to maintain this intricate system 
of interconnected doctrines and rationalizations, they, of course, had 
to destroy the cognitive, aesthetic, and intellectual capacities of gener-
ations of students. They tried, as much as possible, to establish a sys-
tem that would run by itself, a system which, through the legitimation 
strategies of constrain and control and justify and redeem, would se-
verely limit the need for individual ethical judgment. They sought to 
transpose ethics from the realm of cognition and practice to what they 
saw as more lasting and universal form - the form of rules, standards, 
doctrines. They worked on projects like the Restatements and the 
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. They sought to transform 
law and legal ethics into elaborate schedules of carefully drafted pro-
positions. This was said to be "constructive." 
But now that they see what they have wrought, now that all their 
best intentions have turned into endless corridors of bureaucratic le-
galism riddled with instrumentalist opportunism, they blame their ju-
risprudential failures on their offspring. This is sad. These 
observations, of course, could easily be developed into a normative re-
sponse to Judge Harry Edwards. In some sense, his inflammatory 
claims invite and prefigure such a response. But it is important to 
resist this sort of normative impulse. For one thing, it would just be 
another exercise in normative feel-good jurisprudence. For another, in 
its normative destructiveness, it would simply be an expression of 
law's sameness. Besides, there is something more important to do here 
than simply return Judge Edwards' missiles back to sender. That 
something is to illustrate, yet one more time, a key argument of this 
essay: when an entire discipline like the "law" of the academy is con-
structed as a series of legitimations and rationalizations designed to 
avoid taking cognizance of its own violent and destructive character, 
when it is designed in such a way as to destroy indiscriminately new, 
nonconforming thought, it is easy to become ethically disoriented. 
One becomes ethically disoriented precisely because one has already 
lost the aesthetic and cognitive capacities to appreciate what is going 
on. One becomes ethically disoriented because one has become just 
another clerk lost in the maze. 
I do not want to make a normative argument against the maze. I 
do not know about you, but in my experience making normative argu-
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ments to social practices or to psychological formations to try to con-
vince them to reform their own being is just not a terribly successful 
strategy. I have several views as to why this is.22 At least one of them 
is completely contrary to what is routinely taken for granted through-
out virtually all contemporary American legal thought. This view -
one which has been described in this essay - is that deficits in onto-
logical condition will prompt epistemological and normative endeavors 
as compensation for those ontological deficits, and simultaneously 
render these normative and epistemological endeavors entirely ineffec-
tual in correcting those ontological deficits. Now, so long as this point 
is not understood, the normative and epistemological endeavors can 
keep going for a very long time - decades at least, and possibly centu-
ries. Of course, it is also true that if this point is not understood, those 
normative and epistemological endeavors will then seem, for inexplica-
ble reasons, increasingly repetitive and increasingly boring. 
This view is completely contrary to what virtually all contempo-
rary American legal academics take for granted. If one takes seriously 
what they write and what they say, American legal academics seem to 
believe something like the opposite. It is not exactly the opposite, 
however, because it is not just a belief. Indeed, among American legal 
academics, the presupposition that normative or epistemological pre-
scription is somehow competent to address and redress deficits in 
ontological condition is not merely a belief, nor even a sacred truth: it 
is a constitutive aspect of their very being as legal academics. Simi-
larly, this constitutive aspect is critical to the construction of the legiti-
mating strategies of American legal thought described above. In the 
context of this essay, it is easy to see why. If it were the case that 
normative and epistemological endeavors were not capable of trans-
forming the ontology of law, then we, as legal academics would be 
stuck with, and implicated in, what would then appear as the irreduci-
ble and unmediated violence of judges and judging. That, I take it, is 
something that American legal academics are constituted through and 
through to find absolutely intolerable, absolutely unacceptable. 
Hence, they believe that this violence can be transformed through con-
strain and control or justify and redeem into something else - into 
something more palatable, like doctrine, or normative theory, or grand 
dialogue or neopragmatic sensitivity or [ ... ]. That, in short, is how 
we (you and I) get into and help propagate the maze. 
Now, you can tell where this is going. I have been postponing the 
conclusion for some time now. 
22. These views are elaborated in Schlag, supra note 15. 
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* * * 
There is, of course, a way out. And it has been described through-
out this essay. The difficulty with this way out, for most legal academ-
ics, is that it does not, indeed it cannot, reduce to a prescription or a 
recommendation or a solution or even a criticism. So, to the extent 
that one keeps looking for a prescription or a recommendation or a 
solution or a criticism, one will remain in the maze.23 
But for those who find the way out, this is an extraordinarily excit-
ing time in American legal thought. The social formations, the institu-
tional norms, and the professional hierarchies that embody and 
enforce the orthodox jurisprudential strategies of constrain and control 
and justify and redeem seem to be losing some of their hold. Accord-
ingly, for those who have the inclination and the capacity, the study of 
law provides extraordinary opportunities for intellectual creativity -
opportunities that go way beyond the usual "Law and ... "strategies 
of reducing law to some foreign discipline or reducing some foreign 
discipline to the role of supporting cast for the reconstruction of the 
same old law. For those with the inclination and the capacity, there 
are a tremendous number of questions to answer - questions that, in 
virtue of the constrain and control and justify and redeem strategies, no 
one has yet dared to ask. 
23. Of course, from within the maze there are any number of very "moral" rationalizations 
available for remaining in the maze. But, despite these rationalizations, remaining in the maze is 
far from ethically admirable. Consider that what the academic experiences as the dreariness of 
the JOQO.footnote doctrinal or "interdisciplinary" law review article is echoed in the dreariness of 
contemporary Supreme Court opinions which is echoed in the dreariness of the contemporary 
lawyer's bureaucratic practice which is echoed in the dreariness of the bureaucratic mazes 
through which citizens must strive to push their lives. There is nothing ethically admirable about 
these massive self-referential corridors of rules, doctrines, or theories. 
Why then do legal academics remain in the maze? Why do they extend it? Ironically, it is in 
part because they have an admirable disposition which leads them to want to help, to want to do 
something constructive. But, of course, as an ethic, this disposition is woefully incomplete. The 
thing to try to think about is help whom? Construct what? 
